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ABSTRACT 
It is common for end-users to have difficulty in using computer or network 
security appropriately and thus have often been ridiculed when misinterpreting 
instructions or procedures. This discussion paper details the outcomes of research 
undertaken over the past six years on why security is overly complex for end-
users. The results indicate that multiple issues may render end-users vulnerable to 
security threats and that there is no single solution to address these problems. 
Studies on a small group of senior citizens has shown that educational seminars 
can be beneficial in ensuring that simple security aspects are understood and used 
appropriately. 
Keywords End-user, security usability, software usability, ADSL routers, 
Internet Service Providers, cyber security, cyber safety 
 
1.  INTRODUCTION  
The Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS) (ABS, 2012) reported continued 
growth of Internet subscribers, with almost twelve million active Internet 
connections in Australia as of December, 2011. This trend is expected to be 
extended through the Australian Government, National Broadband Network 
(NBN) initiative. Australian consumers will have access to a high-speed Internet 
connection, through either fibre optic cabling, or fixed wireless technologies 
(DBCDE, 2011). The incentives for adopting an Internet connection are varied. 
For the millennial generation social communication, gaming, and educational 
resources are typically sourced online while baby boomers and baby busters may 
have less of a need to access the Internet. However, live news, share trading, 
banking, online shopping discounts, medical advice, entertainment and travel 
resources provide significant incentives for all generations to have Internet access. 
Unfortunately, the Internet has made it increasingly easy for individuals to use 
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this medium for profiteering scams, fraud and online attacks. Whilst operating 
system updates, anti-virus scanners, and personal firewalls reduce the probability 
of successful attacks, to be effectively protected end-users must recognise their 
importance, understand their functionality, and most importantly know how to 
optimize the protection mechanisms’ potential. Moreover, sophisticated phishing 
scams, conflicting opinions on ideal security software, and technical cyber 
security jargon, have made it challenging for the average consumer to protect 
themselves online. Government departments have taken it upon themselves to 
create online portals (Get Safe Online, 2012; StaySmartOnline, 2010) with 
detailed information for protecting end-users online. However, the content tends 
to be limited, and does not address all aspects of online security in a rapidly 
changing environment. 
Opinion is divided on who should be responsible for the online protection of 
novice end-users. Manufacturers continually enhance products and technologies 
to help protect end-users from online threats; however some manufacturers, 
professionals and academics believe that cyber security responsibility lies with the 
individual (Phippen & Furnell, 2007). End-users must be well aware of the risks 
and the potential outcomes, if sufficient cyber security is to be applied. Secondly, 
the user must have the appropriate supporting information to guide them through 
the implementation of the security process. Individuals are generally aware that 
their home premises could be physically broken into, and as a result consider a 
house alarm as one method of protection. Television, print and online media 
promote the simplicity of how a wireless network could be broken into and used 
to access or steal data (Seymour, 2010). However, simply highlighting the online 
risks, without providing solutions, may not result in effective actions by the end-
user to secure a wireless network. 
The paper presents six years of accumulated research into identifying the 
misconceptions and challenges that end-users face when attempting to utilise 
security effectively. The research began with an attempt to determine what 
prevents end-users from applying and using security. Figure 1 shows the 
progression of the research activity from an initial anonymous survey of novice 
end-users, which then lead to examining security manuals and undertaking 
personalised face-to-face interviews. The consumer interviews specifically 
identified that Internet Service Providers’ (ISP) employees may be at fault, which 
initiated an ethics approved deceptive interview of ISP staff. The paper discusses 
the security information supplied by ISPs online and the usability of internet 
security software. 
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Figure 1 Timeline of Research Events 
 
2.  SECURITY CHALLENGES 
In 2010, a two week study of 13 anti-virus vendors identified that on average each 
vendor was able to detect and provide a solution, for only 90% of newly released 
malware (Cyveillance, 2010). Vendors may often struggle to detect malware and 
release signature updates, due to malware developers using anti-forensics and 
anti-avoidance techniques (Brand, Valli & Woodward, 2010). Vendors were also 
challenged by the 300% surge in newly released malware specimens throughout 
2009 (ScanSafe, 2009). The statistics indicate the safety limitations to end-users 
who purchase such software particularly as malware takes on new forms. Modern 
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2011 
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interviews of Australia’s ISPs in 
2010 
Usable Online Information: 
Examination of ISP website 
security content in 2010 
Security Software Usability: 
Examination of security software 
usability in 2011 
Misconceived Perceptions: 
Anonymous survey of 163 novice 
end-users in 2006 
Misconceived Perceptions: 
Face-to-face interviews of 23 
novice end-users in 2009 
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malware is targeting devices other than the traditional PC paradigm including; 
Asymmetric Digital Subscriber Line (ADSL) routers, smart phones and gaming 
consoles (Čeleda, Krejčí, Vykopal, & Drašar, 2010; Symantec, 2009). The 
malware specimen known as ‘psyb0t’ alone had the capability of infecting 55 
types and models of ADSL routers, and had been pre-populated with 6000 
usernames and 13000 passwords (Paul, 2009), yet consumers were generally 
unaware of such threats with the worm’s attributes generally reserved for industry 
professionals and academics. 
Most current ADSL routers incorporate an 802.11 wireless access point; however 
many are sold with the wireless access point pre-enabled. If the end-user has no 
need for a wireless network, and does not manually switch off the feature, they 
are providing access to their wireless signal in the immediate neighbourhood. An 
open wireless network, coupled with Wi-Fi pineapples (Simpsons, 2012), can be 
used by cyber criminals to intercept and capture private data. When an end-user 
attempts to connect to their open wireless network, they would connect 
unknowingly, through the Wi-Fi pineapple of a cyber criminal, who can capture 
and misuse private data (Purvis, 2012). This is further problematic with local 
governments and retailers in large cities providing free wireless internet access 
(Hutchinson, 2012). Vendors typically promote the benefits of using a wireless 
network, yet fail to highlight the dangers. Accordingly, an ill-informed end-user 
could leave a wireless network unsecured. 
 
3. MISCONCEIVED PERCEPTIONS 
The millennial generation are encouraged to utilise the Internet to access a range 
of services, with many retailers for instance offering incentives or discounts if 
consumers purchase items or services online. Senior citizens or those who have 
retired from work cannot easily escape the realm of online services. Traditionally, 
they used a passbook to access their savings account but are now encouraged to 
use the Internet for personal monetary transactions, unaware of the associated 
risks (Cook, Szewczyk, & Sansurooah, 2011). Senior citizens who have created a 
portfolio of savings may need to access or manage it through online systems. 
Unfortunately, regardless of the age, qualifications and occupation, many end-
users are unfamiliar with the associated security risks of using the Internet for 
such day-to-day tasks (Szewczyk & Furnell, 2009). 
Since the 1960’s psychological research has explored the link between an 
individual’s attitude and their subsequent behaviour (Ajzen, 1980; Eagly & 
Chaiken, 1993). A positive attitude towards a given subject has been shown to 
result in a positive, proactive behaviour towards that same subject matter. 
Therefore, should an end-user have a positive experience and attitude in 
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configuring an ADSL router, or security software, this should result in a positive, 
and ongoing interest in ensuring the product operates correctly.  However, end-
users who attempt to configure and secure their home networking products 
themselves perceive it as an unpleasant, difficult and a time consuming 
experience generally blaming product manuals, quick start guides, and after sales 
support (Szewczyk, 2006).  
 
To initiate the security research into end-user attitudes and perceptions, an online 
survey was created and deployed targeting novice end-users (Szewczyk, 2006). 
Respondents were encouraged to only attempt the survey if they felt they were 
inexperienced in computing. The anonymous survey was completed by 163 
respondents and showed that over 75% felt unsafe when using the Internet. Many 
knew that online dangers existed, but could not specifically name or identify any 
potential threats moreover, thirty percent of respondents claimed that they applied 
appropriate safeguards to their ADSL router. Factors such as access point 
placement, and adjusting signal strength were beyond the comprehension of many 
respondents, with most end-users utilising trial-and-error approaches to 
successfully configure their ADSL router. 
 
The survey allowed a large sample of responses and was complemented by face-
to-face interviews with 23 novice end-users during 2009. The 23 individuals were 
selected based on their self-confessed skill level in security and computing. The 
aim was to better understand end-users perceptions and attitudes towards their 
security and privacy when using the Internet (Szewczyk & Furnell, 2009). Most 
respondents generally felt unsafe when conducting financial transactions online, 
but felt that they had no other choice. Some felt that large corporations were 
deciding how and where money could be accessed. Many banks for instance will 
offer a small additional interest rate on a savings account which can only be 
accessed via that bank’s website.  Interviewees often felt alone when requiring 
help with such security. Respondents were questioned on where they would 
acquire support from when needing assistance in relation to security. Most 
respondents (20) stated that they would seek support from ISP employees. The 
prominent reason for this was that the respondents felt that ISP employees were 
actually trained, and had the expertise to provide reliable and trustworthy advice 
and guidance on computer and network security. 
Individual perceptions as to whether users would ever be targeted online by 
criminals varied considerably, with many perceiving that their financial status will 
be influential. This in-turn influenced how much security will be applied to their 
computer system. Many respondents believed that a criminal would purposefully 
avoid attacking the computer of an individual with a lower financial income 
(Szewczyk & Furnell, 2009). 
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Naive individuals may not only be targeted online by criminals, but by staff who 
opportunistically seek sales. One interviewee claimed that they took their wireless 
ADSL router to a computer store and were sold another device, with no wireless 
antenna, yet the wireless functionality can be disabled effortlessly on all ADSL 
devices. A lack of awareness and miscommunication between a novice user and a 
salesperson could frequently result in poor outcomes. For instance, many 
interviewees saw anti-virus software as a preventative solution. However, many 
respondents believe that the only viable solution to a computer that is infected 
with malware was to replace the hard drive with a new one. This misconception is 
not surprising, in that many retail outlets, who remove malware from a computer, 
use terminology suggesting that a new hard drive and software are being installed.  
The current attitudes and perceptions of many end-users towards security are 
flawed from a security perspective. End-users must understand that they can be a 
target regardless of their financial income or sensitivity of information on their 
computer. For those in the workforce, some individuals may be provided with 
Security Education, Training and Awareness (SETA) courses at their place of 
employment, which then can be passed on and applied in their home environment. 
Current research has shown that senior citizens are enthusiastic in attending 
training and education seminars (Cook, Szewczyk, & Sansurooah, 2011). Initial 
surveys showed that many senior citizens increased their understanding of 
security risks considerably following simple dissemination of online threats and 
solutions. The key to increasing awareness is making the content enjoyable, 
appropriate for the given audience, and most importantly, simple to comprehend. 
Television media does discuss wireless threats (Seymour, 2010), but generally 
does so in a complicated manner. For instance television media showing criminals 
using the BackTrack Linux Distributions (BackTrack, 2012) may not only further 
confuse the audience, but may also leave them thinking that such an attack may 
never target them, only occurring in science fiction movies. 
 
4. SECURITY LITERATURE 
End-users’ perceptions of computer and network security and the associated 
threats were shown to be inaccurate and their understanding of how to secure an 
ADSL router and wireless network more questionable. Each ADSL router is 
operational out of the box. At most, the end-user will need to run a software 
wizard, or utilise the provided CD to appropriately configure the device. The 
research indicated that many users struggled to apply the appropriate safeguards, 
and often blamed the product literature. In the online survey of 163 individuals, 
87% stated that they had difficulty interpreting and applying the installation 
procedures.  
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Information technology manuals should theoretically present end-users, who have 
varying technical competencies, with simple and effective instructions on how to 
install and secure the given device. Wieringa, Moore and Barnes (1993) suggest 
that a well-designed and usable manual will include; a well written set of 
procedures, information on the most effective way of completing a task, and be 
suitable for both a skilled and novice user. Perelman, Paradis and Barret (1998) 
assert that five criteria should be embedded in all high quality procedural 
literature. A technical manual should have or use: 
1. A well designed index page for quickly locating desirable information 
quickly; 
2. Descriptive page headers and a table of contents; 
3. An outline of the reasons for its creation, the intended audience, and 
required level of expertise; 
4. A detailed glossary to elaborate on uncommon terminology; and 
5. Numerous, large, labelled graphics, clearly depicting each step in the 
procedure. 
The way in which procedures are written and presented by vendors may 
significantly impact their interpretation. End-users placing the blame on poorly 
written manuals could be correct or they were not willing to follow the 
instructions. From 2005 through to 2011, 17 manuals were examined from the 
leading manufacturers of ADSL routers in Australia (Andersson & Szewczyk, 
2011; Szewczyk & Valli, 2009). Informative content to setup and secure the 
device was undeniably present within the manuals; however, the manner in which 
it was presented was questionable, which could leave an end-users confused. 
Since the initial examination of ADSL router manuals in 2005, little has improved 
through to 2011 (Szewczyk & Valli, 2009). As portrayed through Table 1, many 
manuals do not encompass many of the essential elements to ensure that the 
product manual is usable. The most important element being the index page has 
been omitted from the majority of manuals. The computing industry uses a 
copious amount of technical language thus a glossary could easily be used to 
explain complicated terminology. Unfortunately less than fifty percent of the 
manuals examined incorporated this feature. Many computing words have 
become mainstream, but for those with little understanding, the terms Wired 
Equivalent Privacy (WEP) or Wi-Fi Protected Access (WPA) may have little 
meaning in the context of novice end-user security.  
The procedures and graphics are a separate and complicated issue. In many 
instances the graphics are on a small scale and difficult to interpret. Coupled with 
the issue of manuals referring to firmware version 1.x, yet the device 
encompassing firmware version 2.x creates another dilemma in that the interface 
and functions are usually entirely different. Not only does this leave the end-user 
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stranded, but any future updates to the firmware and its associated interface will 
only further make the manual entirely redundant for a novice end-user. Aside 
from a security perspective, vendors do not adequately encourage the use of 
security. For advanced end-users who know which security features should be 
used, the process of following the procedures may seem simple. However, for the 
novice end-user who bases their judgements on the recommendations provided by 
the vendors, this creates an entirely new issue. As shown through Table 1 only 
Netgear continued to encourage and recommend that specific security features be 
implemented. Many vendors would unfortunately stipulate what security features 
are available without justifying their use or benefits. This is problematic in that an 
end-user has little motivation to update the firmware if for instance they are 
unaware of the protection it may provide from embedded malware. 
  
Journal of Digital Forensics, Security and Law, Vol. 7(4) 
 
 
 
59 
Table 1 Comparison and Contrast of Product Literature Design 
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The adoption of a broadband internet connection will presumably continue to 
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increase. The ADSL router provides a simple yet effective security solution at the 
entry point to a home or commercial network. For instance, the manufacturer 
Quality Network Appliance Provider (QNAP) incorporates a feature within its 
devices which notifies the end-user when a firmware update is available. This is 
achieved via a notification window when the end-user logs in to configure the 
device. End-users may unfortunately follow a "setup-and-forget" approach 
meaning there is no reason to access the configuration options on a regular basis. 
Subsequently, manufacturers should incorporate simple software on the already 
included configuration media which checks and downloads any appropriate 
updates to the ADSL router should it become available – similar to anti-virus 
software. There is enough deterrence with updating firmware as it is, with many 
manufacturers including numerous warnings regarding how the device may 
become damaged with an inappropriate firmware upgrade. A streamline approach 
may not only ensure an end-users safety online, but also remove any unnecessary 
confusion presented to the end-user. 
 
5. INTERNET SERVICE PROVIDERS AND INSECURITY 
The research interviews and surveys described above identified that many 
respondents re-iterated their perception of employees, working within Internet 
Service Internet Providers (ISPs), as being experts in computer and network 
security (Szewczyk, 2006; Szewczyk & Furnell, 2009) yet such employees are 
not necessarily employed to provide guidance or advice on security. Furthermore, 
the role of an employee working on a help desk may attract an inexperienced 
individual, who may rely on opinion on computing and security. However, ISP 
employees are perceived as a convenient, 24 hour, 7 days a week source of 
advice. To evaluate the quality of advice provided by ISP staff, the research 
utilised a deceptive interview approach, whereby the researcher mimicked a 
novice end-user over the telephone (Szewczyk, 2010). Seven of the largest ISPs 
in Australia were contacted over a three month period and questioned over 
methods for both securing an ADSL router, and a computer. 
Unsurprisingly, whilst novice end-users may perceive ISP employees as experts, 
their guidance and recommendations were far from ideal from a security 
viewpoint when compared to current industry recommendations and best 
practices (Goodrich & Tamassia, 2011; Nahorney, 2009). When the issue of 
securing an ADSL router were raised, ISP staff would either direct the researcher 
towards the product manual, the ISP’s website, or in one instance provide a very 
invalid response by stating that “ADSL routers do not have security settings” 
(Szewczyk, 2010). Clearly, the manual itself lacks readability and encouragement 
for the end-user. However, to claim that the device has no security functionality 
may clearly endanger an end-user.  
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The employees at times did provide realistic and ideal responses, yet many 
continued to provide erroneous responses. When questioned over recommended 
wireless or computer security options, opinion, rather than fact began to emerge. 
Many ISP employees continued to re-iterate that WEP was the ideal wireless 
security setting, whilst others would direct the researcher to utilising information 
found on the ISP website, or towards Google – with no clear indication as to what 
terms should be searched for. In terms of computer security advice, the employees 
were more skilled when recommending that a personal firewall and anti-virus 
software be installed. Two employees, from two ISP were unhelpful and unaware, 
stating that Windows 7 is secure out-of-the-box and does not need any additional 
modification. In one instance, the employee stated that the local computer store 
should be approached for advice and recommendations on which software would 
be more suitable. 
The results of the survey indicate that the employees within ISPs, whilst being 
somewhat helpful, did not possess the knowledge or skill set required to suitably 
advise customers seeking help when compared industry best practices for 
safeguarding a computer or ADSL router.  Whilst there is not just one solution to 
a particular security issue, there are at least ideal answers which could have been 
provided. An additional outcome amongst the feedback provided by employees 
was that of the content located on their website. Many employees re-iterated that 
there was an abundance of information on the ISP website which detailed best 
practices for ensuring that a computer, network and ADSL router are secured 
appropriately.  
From the information reviewed, no-where amongst help pages or contact 
information provided by Australian ISPs does it state that it is the job of the help 
desk employees to provide security advice. This could be a positive characteristic 
because it reduces the amount of training that employees needed to function in 
their role. Being an entry level position in the IT industry, many help desk 
employees would be beginning their career at such a premise. So why then, do the 
employees take it upon themselves to not only provide advice on security related 
matters, but more seriously provide incorrect recommendations? Whilst these 
employees may feel the need to help those seeking guidance, in many instances 
they have been identified as providing inappropriate advice. In the majority of 
instances, the end-user seeking guidance would have been additionally vulnerable 
to internet based attacks. An ISP needs to train staff appropriately to handle such 
incidents where a customer seeks guidance. Alternatively, employees within an 
ISP need to be directed that they do not provide any security related guidance.  
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6. UNUSABLE ONLINE INFORMATION 
ISP employees encouraged customers to utilise the security information on their 
website. In most occurrences the employees were unable to direct the customer to 
the exact location of the information. Empirical investigations conducted by Tan 
and Wei (2006) demonstrated that a well-structured website will facilitate end-
users in locating desirable information and accomplishing their goals. Hence, 
security information on each ISP website should be easily located and designed in 
a manner which will permit the end-user to navigate to the required sections. 
More importantly, the website should attract an end-user into the security section 
so that security can be applied or reviewed if it hasn’t already been done so. 
Eleven websites of ISPs in Australia were examined for their accessibility, 
currency, and accuracy of security related content (Szewczyk, 2010). 
Unfortunately, only two ISPs had content which was easily accessible, simple to 
locate, and relevant for the time period, equipment and operating systems 
currently utilised. 
There are numerous issues which emerged from the examination of ISP based 
online security information. In some instances, even though Windows 7 has been 
available for a considerable period of time, many were still referring to, and 
showing step-by-step instructions for Windows 98 or Windows XP. 
Subsequently, in some instances an ISP would demonstrate how to install a 
specific piece of software (personal firewall, or anti-virus software), although 
would be showing a product which is outdated by three to five years. Locating 
security related information on many of the ISP websites was almost impossible. 
As demonstrated in Figure 2 and 3, a search for “wireless security” can yield 
entirely diverse results. One ISP has results which related to the purchase of 
wireless based products from within their online shopping portal, whilst the 
second ISP did actually yield correct and appropriate results.  
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Figure 2 Bigpond Search Results for Wireless Security 
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Figure 3 Westnet Search Results for Wireless Security 
Two of the eleven ISPs examined encompassed security information which was 
easily accessible, current and accurate. These two ISPs – iinet and Westnet are 
generally targeted towards heavy internet users or those individuals who could be 
perceived as IT professionals and enthusiasts. However, large Australian ISPs 
such as Bigpond or Optus who are generally utilised by novice and leisurely end-
users did not encompass any usable security information. This is ironic in that it is 
these novice end-users who would usually require the most support and guidance 
when utilising the Internet, rather than being sold products that they have no real 
use for. 
A significant issue amongst the security related information of the remaining 
seven ISPs was that of how the information is actually presented. It is of no 
benefit to an end-user to state that an ADSL router password should be changed – 
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if there is no recommendation on good password practices, or details as to how 
the password should actually be changed. Many ISPs also shifted the security on 
Internet Security Suites, as an all in one solution for mitigating any internet 
related threats. On the other hand, Bigpond and Optus, were not only using scare 
tactics but also marketing their own proprietary security software as a world 
market leader according to their own independent studies. These products were 
relatively expensive, claimed to be top of the range, and discouraged the use of 
freely available security software. There are many freely available software 
packages available which provide reasonable online protection, yet many ISPs 
would negate the quality of the freely available software. 
It is not surprising that many ISP employees were unable to direct the research 
towards the security information on the ISP website, seeing that in most instances, 
the information did not actually exist. There are eleven prominent ISPs in 
Australia, yet only two of these emphasise security and privacy to its customers. 
The information on many of these websites needs to be regularly updated and 
easily accessible. In addition ISPs need to focus on showing freely available 
products to their customers as a means of securing their computer as this may not 
only protect the end-user, but may also prevent potential attack on the ISP or its 
other customers.   
 
7. SECURITY SOFTWARE USABILITY 
The security information supplied by ISPs on their website was generally 
outdated and difficult to locate, and in most instances did not adhere to good 
website design practices (Tan & Wei, 2006). However, many of the statements 
did encourage the use of security software. Whilst traditional security software 
made use of a personal firewall and a separate anti-virus program, many vendors 
today are integrating each of these elements into an Internet Security Suite. There 
is also a trend with vendors marketing their products as usable, easy-to-use, and 
simple. ZoneAlarm’s Product Manager Jordy Berson (2005) claims – even his 
parents could utilise his product. The usability of security software has been a 
long standing issue. In 1975 it was identified that end-users would fail to adopt 
security systems unless they were easy to use (Saltzer & Schroeder, 1975). In the 
paper “Why Johnny Can’t Encrypt” (Whitten & Tygar, 1999) the researchers 
identified that with a well-designed interface, participants in their study were still 
unable to use the software effectively. Retail outlets and ISPs are encouraging 
end-users to utilise Internet Security Software. This initiated the question of how 
usable are the available Internet Security Suites.  
The top ten Internet Security Suites were acquired and evaluated for their 
responses and subsequent usability – when presented with current malware, recent 
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phishing sites, and penetration testing network scans (Szewczyk, 2011). Well-
designed Internet Security Suites can play an important role in both protecting and 
educating end-users. Should an end-user visit a malicious website, the software 
may either block the website, or block and educate the end-user as to why the 
website could be malicious. Many personal firewalls will react and notify the end-
user if a service is attempting to access the Internet. An unrecognisable service 
name has little merit in helping the end-user decide if they should allow or deny 
the service, or internet access. Meaningful explanations coupled with the potential 
risks of permitting the service to access the Internet have significant advantages in 
allowing the end-user to make the correct decision. 
Many of the Internet Security Suites incorporated elements which would deter or 
prevent a novice end-user from protecting themselves effectively. Kaspersky 
raised a notification on the bottom of the browser stating “dangerous URL”. It did 
not provide any further information, or explain what a URL is, potentially leaving 
an end-user confused with how to proceed. Alternatively eScan would block a 
phishing website with text stating “Access Denied” followed by “Suspected 
Phishing Site”, without a definition or possible consequences should an end-user 
proceed. In a similar manner Bit Defender presented the user with “The webpage 
has been blocked” because it “included objects that were infected”, providing 
little information as to what an object is, or where it originated. There is little 
merit from the end-users perspective, for security software to block access to a 
website, without any justification. If a potential threat is detected, it would be 
appropriate for the security product to provide a brief outline of why the website 
has been blocked, dangers associated with the website, and a recommendation on 
how to proceed. 
The guidance provided with relation to dealing with malware appears to be an 
overlooked task by vendors. Mimicking the process of an end-user downloading a 
malicious file - a malware specimen was placed on the desktop of the test 
workstation. Bit Defender, Eset, and Norton, immediately block access to the 
binary. No explanation was provided as to why the file was inaccessible; instead 
an alert was raised informing the end-user of a virus. Norton in particular would 
not permit the file to be deleted. In every instance that an attempt was made to 
delete the file, Norton would alert that a threat was present, and that file was 
inaccessible. However, once a system virus scan was initiated, the file was 
removed. Such a process is not only confusing and complicated for a novice end-
user, but also does not clearly provide step-by-step instruction as to what needs to 
be undertaken to remove the threat. 
One of the prevalent outcomes of the experiment was how little control an end-
user has once a workstation is infected with malware. Software alerts are 
generated notifying of the threat. However, the end-user is predominantly 
Journal of Digital Forensics, Security and Law, Vol. 7(4) 
 
 
 
67 
instructed to click through a series of acceptances to initiate a scan or to agree in 
removing the malware specimen, in technical uninformative instructions. Trend 
Micro, and ZoneAlarm did raise an alert of a potential virus when accessing the 
website containing the malware specimen. This fortunately did permit the user to 
agree or disagree in downloading the potential threat to their system. Whilst an 
explanation of the threat was raised, no recommendations were generated as to 
whether or not the user should continue with the download or omit it entirely. 
Security software usability will always be an ongoing issue. However, vendors do 
have the options to simplify the decision making process and even educate the 
end-user as to what could happen if a certain option is chosen. The term virus has 
become mainstream throughout the years, so anytime the word virus appears; this 
should come across as dangerous to the end user. However, other controls are 
more technical and require advance knowledge, or further education before any 
decision can be made. When a Windows service requires access to the Internet, 
the firewall will stipulate the process name that requires access. These process 
names can be quite meaningless. However, the process could be an anti-virus 
software requiring access to update its signatures, or a malicious host attempting 
to access the workstation.  
 
8. EDUCATION AS A SOLUTION 
The fundamental criteria for helping end-users use security effectively is 
education. Senior citizens are perhaps most impacted by having to undertake in 
many online activities, yet a simple education program designed to explain 
security concepts has shown success in early trials (Cook, Szewczyk, & 
Sansurooah, 2011). In a similar manner that a child learns mathematics and 
languages in primary school, end-users must learn security techniques and best 
practices from the ground up. A group of senior citizens were told how and why a 
criminal may want to send phishing scams via email. A collection of legitimate 
and phishing emails were then shown to the group with a greater emphasis placed 
on the emails that were misleading. The group was shown step-by-step how to 
identify phishing emails, and within a short space of time were able to confidently 
identify fraudulent emails themselves.  
Applying this method to online, security information portals; product manuals; 
and security software may successfully improve end-users’ awareness and 
understanding of online threats. The predominant flaw amongst all information 
sources was assumed prior knowledge, which end-users usually do not have. For 
instance, if security software has an option to enable phishing detection, an end-
user may disregard this if they are unfamiliar with its purpose. In the context of 
wireless network, vendors could outline the potential consequences of using a 
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wireless network and complement these with step-by-step solutions to mitigate 
each of the risks. Internet Security Suites are flawed in a similar manner, in that 
end-users may not necessarily know which feature should be enabled on a 
personal firewall or anti-virus software. However, providing a “ground-up” 
tutorial on common threats, and how the software can mitigate these, may educate 
the end-user, and act as a selling point for the software provider. 
 
9. CONCLUSION 
There is no doubt that end-users must protect themselves online, but the question 
remains who should be initiate this task. End-users are constantly presented with 
new challenges in the online world. The media has raised concerns over the 
Facebook timeline feature, showing end-users how to implement privacy settings 
on their account (Jacobsson, 2012). However, no where does it actually stipulate 
specific dangers if this is not adequately secured. Subsequently, end-users must be 
made more aware of the risks if proper action is not taken, but it must be 
explained using a jargon free, non-technical language.  
This research has been undertaken over a six year timeframe to determine if using 
security is in fact a difficult task or if end-users are at fault when becoming a 
victim to an Internet based attack. Each research project emerged from a prevalent 
outcome from the previous research project. The research suggests that there are 
in fact many factors which could potentially deter or prevent an end-user from 
being secured. Security will never be adopted and usable by end-users if vendors 
continue to develop products without novice end-users as a part of the design 
process. ISPs are currently perceived by novice end-users as a reliable source of 
information, yet the deceptive study showed that the advice could have been 
improved upon significantly. In Australia, there is no call centre for end-users to 
communicate with an expert in cyber security. As a result, ISPs could take it upon 
themselves in providing security support to its customers.  
Academics, commercial organisations, and governments have all attempted to 
help end-users use security effectively. Future research will focus on formulating 
and testing methods to educate novice end-users on the ways to implement, use 
and understand cyber security. This is vitally important in that technology is 
evolving at a rapid pace and is in-turn allowing criminals to exploit and develop 
threats for devices beyond the traditional PC. Subsequently end-users must have 
the appropriate educational material to protect themselves from future online 
dangers.  
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